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This paper reports on ongoing work on the syntax and semantics of identity 
constructions .  In particular, I will highlight the semantic differences between 
what I call the pronominal identity construction (PIC) exemplified in ( 1 ) ,  and the 
expletive identity construction (EIC) as shown in (2) . 
(1) PIC : Pronominal Identity Construction: she/he/I.. .BE NP 
a. She is the director. b .  She might be the director. 
c .  Sie ist die Regisseurin . 
(2) EIC : Expletive Identity Construction: it/this BE NP 
a .  I t  i s  the director. b .  It might be the director. 
c .  Es ist die Regisseurin . 
Identity constructions with modals have recently received attention in the work 
of Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman (1994, 1996, henceforth GSV) in Dynamic 
Modal Predicate Logic . A theoretical point made in this paper is that dynamic 
modal quantification over assignments as proposed by GSV yields inadequate 
meanings for PIC's ,  and is linguistically implausible in EIC' s, arguing against it 
altogether (cf. section 4 . 1 . ) .  
The (tentative) conclusion will be that while PIC's  represent ordinary 
equative copular sentences ,  EIC ' s  are closely akin to cleft constructions .  In fact 
I will present arguments in favor of analyzing clefts as expanded EIC ' s  (or EIC ' s  
as reduced clefts if you like) . 
1 .  Some Stunning Contrasts 
Sad News. Upon coming back to your hotel, you learn from the receptionist that 
one of your accomplices has had an accident down at the harbor. You are 
supposed to see her or him in the hospital , but in the hectic course of events the 
receptionist forgot to take down the name of your friend , and since there' s a 
bunch of you, it is unclear which of your friends is the actual victim. Under such 
circumstances it seems appropriate for you to utter (3 . a) ,  but not (3 .b) ,  meaning , 
'Maybe the person who had the accident is none other than my best friend 
Julius. ' 
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(3) A friend of mine had an accident. 
a. Es k6nnte mein bester Freund sein. 
a: It might be my best friend.  
b .  # Er k6nnte mein bester Freund sein. 
b :  # He might be my best friend .  
Herzblatt. For something more fun,  suppose I participate i n  a game show . 
Having talked to three female candidates without actually seeing them, I finally 
blindly pick one (say,  candidate #3) as my ' sweetheart' , which subsequently is  
presented to me behind a removable wall. I know, as  everybody else, that the 
candidates were Andrea, an architect from Berlin, Anja, a student of medicine 
from Frankfurt and, Sandra a seamstress from Goslar. To increase tension, the 
game show host may say (4 . a) ,  but hardly (4 .b) .  
(4) (game show host) With me behind this wall is your sweetheart. 
a. Es k6nnte die Schneiderin aus Goslar sein. 
a: It might be the seamstress from Goslar. 
b .  # Sie k6nnte die Schneiderin aus Goslar sein. 
b :  # She might be the seamstress from Goslar. 
c .  Sie k6nnte eine mittelalterliche Prinzessin sein (so schon ist sie) . 
c :  She could be a medieval princess (given how beautiful she is) . 
Note, too , at this point that his typical game show host charm might also �low 
him to say (4 . c) ;  I will come back to this below (the German modal konnte is the 
translation for both might and could). 
Reflections on Fate and Chance (still game show) . At the same show we 
might imagine a philosopher game show host, who would perhaps say (5 . b) . 
(5) With me behind this wall is tonight' s  winner. 
a. Es M.tte auch die Verliererin sein k6nnen. 
a:  It could just as well have been the loser. 
b .  Sie hatte auch die Verliererin sein k6nnen. 
b :  She could just as well have been the loser. 
Suppose, he said (5 .a) instead, then that doesn' t  seem to be a reflection about the 
course of life, but a reflection about possible different game shows,  employing 
different rules . 
An Unexpected Visitor. This is a short one: Hearing a knock on the door, 
my mother says (6 . a) ,  but surely not (6 .b) . 
(6) A man is at the door. lEin Mann steht vor der Tilr. 
a. Es k6nnte Herr Neson sein. a: It might be Mr Neson. 
b .  # Er k6nnte Herr Neson sein. b :  # He might be Mr Neson. 
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Homo Faber vs. the Monk. Imagine in your holidays you see an elderly man 
kissing a young woman . With a shudder of disgust (or jealousy?) you say (7.a) .  
Max Frisch, a famous writer who happens to be  in  the same group as you, but 
knows more about the man's  background even says (7 .b) .  
(7) That old guy just kissed this woman. 
a .  Dabei konnte sie seine Tochter sein ! 
a�  She could be his daughter, though ! 
b .  Dabei konnte es seine Tochter sein ! 
b �  It could be his daughter, though! 
It seems that in saying (7.b) ,  Frisch presupposes that that man actually has a 
daughter and that there' s  a serious chance that his daughter is noone other than 
the woman that was kissed .  For all you know, the guy may be a monk who fell 
for female charmes for the very first time, and, evidently with someone below 
his own age group. 
2 .  Towards an Explanation 
Before turning to the actual analysis I want to propose, let me clarify the 
commonalities in all the scenarios considered in the last section . In each case we 
are dealing with a situation in which the actual identity of someone mentioned in 
the linguistic context is unclear. Thus the speaker in (3) , in using the indefinite 
afriend o/mine does not actually know which person had the accident . Similarly 
with the referent of the someone knocking at the door, as with the identity of 
' this woman' (I ' ll come back to the game show cases after the commercials) . 
If we conceive of a speaker' s  information state s, i . e. her factual 
knowledge, as a set of worlds ,  i .e .  those worlds which according to the speaker 
could well be the real world, then the situations above have in common that in 
different worlds in s ,  different individuals are the friend who had an accident, the 
man at the door, or the woman kissed . If you prefer to think that an information 
state s is a set of world--assignment pairs (so called possibilities) , in which each 
world again is a candidate for the real world and the assignment tied to it reflects 
a hypothesis about the identity of discourse referents mentioned so far, the 
situations above are characterized by the fact that not all assignments in (pairs in) 
s assign the same individual to the expression used to refer to the friend, the 
stranger, and the woman, respectively .  
But what is really puzzling about the examples in section 1 .2 is our 
intuition that while EIC ' s  like it could be my best friend really do express this 
uncertainty w.r . t .  to the referent of the NP, PIC ' s  don ' t. To the contrary, the 
reason why he might be my best friend ( = (3 .b» sounds odd is precisely that it 
seems to make a statement about a particular person rather than about the 
concept ' the friend of mine who had an accident' .  Looking at the game show 
cases , it should be noted that the game show host speaks from the perspective of 
the candidate: 'Given what you -- the candidate -- knows, it might be the 
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seamstress from Goslar who is standing here with me' . But again, using the PIC 
as in (4 .b) (she might be the seamstress from Goslar) ,  he would seem to say 
instead: 'Given what you know, Andrea (who is standing behind this wall) could 
be the seamstress from Goslar' , which, evidently, is not the case. Even the 
candidate knows that Andrea is the architect from Berlin .  He doesn't  think 
Andrea could be a seamstress, or Anja an architect, or Sandra a student of 
medicine. He just doesn' t  know who's  behind the wall . 
2. 1 .  PIes as plain 'de re ' statements 
Consider again (3) , repeated here in (8) , with its dynamic logic translation (8 . a) .  
Importantly, the existential quantifier introduced by the indefinite a friend of 
mine does not have scope over the entire formula. By the point its scope ends 
(the closing bracket) it has done the following : Out of an initial information state 
s it has collected all those possibilities < w,g > E s in which g(x) is a friend of 
mine who had an accident in w. This is formally spelled out in the definitions in 
(8 .b) through (8 . d) . l 
(8) A friend of mint\ had an accident. # Hex might be my best friend. 
a .  3x[f-o-m(x) & had-acc(x)] & 0 best-f-o-m(x) 
b.  s[P(th o o . ,tJ] = {i E s l  < i(t1) , o o . , i(t:J > E i(P)} 
c .  s[cJI & �] = s[cJI] [�] 
d .  S[3xcJI] = U dED(s[x/d] [cJI]) 
d :  s[x/d] = { < w ,g > 1 3g ' [  < w,g '  > E s & g'  is identical to g 
except that g ' (x) =d} (defined iff x � dom(g» 
NB :  i(a) , with i = < w,g > abbreviates f(a)(w) , if a is a constant, or 
g(a) , if a is a variable. 
Importantly, due to my ignorance as to who actually had the accident, g(x) and 
g '(x) could be different individuals even for two < w,g > , < w ',g ' >  E s .  
Let us assume for concreteness that there are three friends of mine who 
each might have been involved in the accident, Julius (my best friend) , Lionel, 
and Rufus .  Accordingly, (9 .a) through (9 .c) are elements of my information state 
s (of course each of those stand for a large set of possibilities that differ in 
(irrelevant aspects of) w, though not in g) .  
(9) a .  
b .  
c .  
< w,g > : g(x) =Julius, and Julius had the accident in w 
< w' ,g ' > :  g ' (x) =Lionel, and Lionel had the accident in w '  
< w" ,g" > :  g"(x) =Rufus, and Rufus had the accident in w "  
The question i s  now how to interpret the modal. Evidently, the modal in (8 .a) is 
interpreted as epistemic (given what the speaker knows) , and , as we just saw, the 
speaker ' s  knowledge is appropriately modelled as a set of possibilities . 
Pretending that might/could expresses existential quantification over possibilities , 
does s[O my-best-jriend(x)) say ( lO .a) or ( IO .b)? In other words, does it quantify 
over world-assignment pairs , or over worlds only? 
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keep all possibilities in s, iff according to some possibility 
< w*,g* > E s, g*(x) is my best friend in w* 
retain only those possibilities < w*,g*  > E s  with some < w ',g ' >  
E s such that g '(x) =g*(x) and g*(x) is my best friend in w '  
I will now show that (lO .a) is incorrect and (lO .b) is correct. This argument is 
somewhat involved, for remember that we want to explain the oddness of 
sentence (8) in the scenario describe above. Accordingly, the right meaning for 
the modal is the one on which something about (8 .a) is  wrong. So I will show 
that i) Negative Argument: (10 .a) predicts that the speaker can felicitously utter 
he could be my best friend in the circumstances described (i . e. (9» ; since this is  
empirically incorrect, so is (lO .a) .  ii) Positive Argument: ( 10 .b) predicts that the 
speaker cannot felicitously utter the sentence (because she would violate the 
Maxim of Quality) in doing so ;  this is empirically correct , lending evidence to 
( lO .b) 
The Maxim of Quality requires the speaker to say things she believes to 
be true. In other words, the speaker' s knowledge (her information state s) must 
entail the meaning of "'. Put the other way around , '" should not add knowledge 
to s, i .e .  updating the speaker' s  information state s with ", should yield s again , 
not a subset of s .  
( 1 1 )  Quality : 
Sentence '" can felicitously be uttered by a speaker iff the speaker' s 
informations state s entails the truth of "',  that is ,  iff s supports ", . 2  
Suppose (lO .a) was the right definition . Given the information state s sketched in 
(9) above, (lO .a) is clearly met by possibilities of the type (9 .a) (since in all 
those w, Julius is my best friend) . Note that due to (lO .a) we are entitled to keep 
all possibilities in s (including those of type (9 .b) and (9 . c» in this situation. A 
formula of this type is often called a test; it either leaves the information state or 
leads to the absurd state straightaway. 
Given that according to (lO .a) ,  (8 . a) is a test, and that s as schematized 
in (9) meets this test, s supports (8 . a) ,  so (8) should be felicitous for someone to 
utter who has the information sketched in (9) . But it is not, concluding (i) . 
Consider now (lO .b) .  First note that ( lO .b) may reduce an information 
state rather than just test it (it is a so-called eliminative update) . Does it eliminate 
possibilities out of (9)? Evidently, I know who my best friend is ,  i .e .  for all 
< w,g > E s, /(my-best-jriend ') (w) = Julius .  Hence, possibilities of the type (9 . a) 
will survive after updating with 0 my-best-friend(x) . But those of type (9 . b) and 
(9 . c) vanish . So s[(8. a)) ¢ s (it doesnt even subsist in s[(8. a)]) . Therefore, ( 1 1) , 
Quality , is violated in (8) . Since this is what we want, we assume that ( lO .b) is 
correct; this concludes the positive argument (ii) . 3 The definition in (12 .a) gives 
a dynamic logic rendering of (lO .b) , the one I propose to adopt. 
( 12) a. s [ O cI»] = { < w , g > 1 3w ' , g ' , g " [ < w ' , g " > E s & g C g ' & 
< w' ,g ' > E s[cI»]]}  
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b .  S[ <> BO�] = { < W,g > 1 3w' ,g ' [w' E BG(w) & g £; g ' & < w' ,g ' > 
E s[�]]} 
( 12 .b) basically expresses the same idea, but takes into consideration that modals 
can be used non-epistemica1ly. Upon reflection , a definition along the lines of 
(10 .a) automatically equates the modal background with the information state. 
This is evidently inaccurate, because, as just said , modals might be evaluated 
w .r. t. non-epistemic backgrounds (see Kratzer 1984 for fundamental discussion) . 
The idea behind (12 .b) then is that in every < w,g > ,  BG(w) is the set of worlds 
which make up the modal background in w. 
Let us return to the game show with that in mind . Take the odd example 
( 1 3 . a) first, translates as in ( 13 .b) with the assumed circumstantial background 
in ( 13 . c) .  
( 13) a. 
b .  
c .  
With me behind the wall is your sweetheart. # She might be the 
seamstress from Goslar. 
behind-wall(tx[sweetheart(x,you)]) & <> Boseamstress-f-g(x) 
BG(w) = worlds according to what the candidate knows in w 
Note again that <> BG does not affect the value of g(x) at all . If the game show 
host knows that Anja is standing behind the wall , ( 13 .a) would mean that the 
candidate considers it possible that Anja is the seamstress from Goslar -- contrary 
to fact. Even if the game show host did not know whether Anja or Andrea are 
standing behind the wall , (13 .a) would still say that either Anja is  standing 
behind the wall and the candidate considers it possible that Anja is the 
seamstress , or Andrea is standing there and the candidate thinks Andrea might be 
the seamstress . But again, the candidate knows that Andrea is the seamstress and 
Anja the to-be doctor, so (13 . a) is just not appropriate. Finally , if the game show 
host knows it' s Sandra (the seamstress) behind the wall , he asserts that Sandra, 
according to the speaker' s knowledge, could be the seamstress from Goslar, 
which is not literally false, but infelicitous ,  given that the candidate knows she is. 
Contrast this with (14) .  Here again the background is not a realistic one, 
but rather something like ( 14 .b) .  So whoever the game show host knows or 
believes to know to be standing there is said to meet the medieval princess 
criteria in at least some w ' E BG(w) . Nothing ' s odd about this ,  and the PIC is 
felicitous. 
(14) a. 
b .  
( 15) a. 
b. 
[ . . .  ] She could be a medieval Princess . 
BG(w) = worlds in which medieval princesses exist and accord to 
whatever criteria we associate with medieval princesses in w 
[ . . .  ] She could just as well have been the loser. 
BG(w) = worlds in which the rules of the game are as in w,  but 
the actual course of the game has been different 
Reconsider (15) now. Given what we have said so far it plainly says that the 
actual person behind this wall (in w) could have lost the game in some other 
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world w ' E BG(w), the latter set defined by some notion of similarity to w. 
Again, this seems a perfectly natural thing to say, so we predict the PIC to be 
well-formed. 
Now, finally , for Mr Neson. Assuming thatf(Mr-Neson '} {w) is  the same 
individual in all worlds w, ( 16 .a) is completely parallel to case (S . a) above. 
However, while it seems unlikely for a speaker to be unclear about the identity 
of her best friend, it seems less impossible to interpret the name Mr Neson as a 
non-rigid designator, i . e. as a contingent individual concept. Accordingly , (16 .b) 
-- with the stress pattern indicated -- sounds much better than ( 16 .a) .  The reason 
is that this time it is not the assignment-dependent reference of he which is 
unclear, but the world-dependent reference of Mr Neson. 
( 16) a. 
b. 
Someone' s  knocking at the door. # He could be Mr Neson . 
HE could be Mr Neson . 
The general schema of PIC sentences , then , is given in ( 17) .  
( 17) hex might be P:  for all < w ,g > E s ,  g(x) is P in some w '  E BG(w) 
In the special case of epistemic background s ,  BG(w) i s  (roughly) 
{w ' 1 3g: < W ',g > E s} for all w in s .  Yet, we have clearly seen that modals seem 
to regard the second , worldly quantification, not the first one. Once we assume 
this,  the data around PIC' s  follow. 
2. 2. EIC's as 'Reduced Clefts ' 
Let us now turn to EIC ' s .  Recall from the contrasting pairs in 1 . 1 .  above that the 
EIC seems appropriate in those cases where the PIC is not, namely those cases 
in which the modal seems to express quantification over assignment- rather than 
world-possibilities . 
There are two basic ways to capture this :  Either we allow for two 
different ways to treat assignments in modal constructions (roughly : ignore them 
in PIC ' s but bind them in EIC ' s) or we assume that the apparent quantification 
over assignments is really due to quantification over worlds (by the modal) in the 
EIC ' s .  It is the latter option I want to argue for here. The intuition I 'd  like to 
elaborate on is that a sentence like ( I8 .a) in the context given above expresses 
the same proposition as that in ( IS .  b) , predicate logically rendered in ( I S . c) .  
(1 S) a. 
b .  
c .  
It could b e  the seamstress from Goslar. 
It could be the seamstress from Goslar, who is standing behind the 
wall. 
3x[sfG(x) & vy[sfG(x) - x = y] & <> x = Ly[behind-wall(y)]] 
On a pre-theoretical level it should be evident that all the EIC examples from 
above lend themselves to such an analogy: 
(19) a. 
b. 
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It could be my best friend, who had an accident. 
It could be the seamstress from Goslar, who is standing behind 
this wall. 
c .  It could as well have been the loser, who is standing behind this 
wall. 
d .  It could be  Mr Neson, who is knocking on the door. 
Does that work formally as well? Yes . To see this ,  take again (19 . a) in the 
scenario schematized in (9) , i .e .  the speaker does not know whether Julius (his 
best friend) , Lionel or Rufus had the accident; the three possibilities are 
represented by the three worlds--assignment pairs < w,g, > ,  < w ',g ' >  and 
< w ",g " > , respectively . The representation of the sentence is given in (20) . 
(20) 3x[friend(x) & Vy[as-good-a-friend-as(x , y) - x = y] & <> Box = ty[had­
accident(y) ]] 
Let's zoom in right behind the &-sign . < w,t > survives updating with 
<> BoX = ty[had-accident(y)J iff in some w* E BG(w) , g(x) (alias Julius) had an 
accident in w* (I ignore the uniqueness issue for the time being) . Turning now 
to < w ',g ' > , absolutely nothing changes , for g '(x) is again Julius (the best 
friend) , and BG(w ') will cum grano salis equal BG(w). Likewise, g "(X) is Julius, 
so the same reasoning applies. In that respect, the fact that the identity of the 
person who has had an accident is unclear, remains irrelevant, it seems .  
However, note that <> BaX= ty[had-accident(y)J] will be uninformative w. r . t .  BG 
if ty[had-accident(y)J were a constant function in BG. 
Summing up, assuming that EIC 's literally contain a description (or an 
individual concept for that matter) within the scope of the modal, combined with 
the assumption that the modal quantifies over worlds (though not assignments) 
readily captures the semantics of the ErC . But how do I get the description in 
ErC ' s? My proposal is that there is an empty category in the predicate position 
of ErC ' s which is interpreted as description in intenso. In the next section I will 
become more precise about the syntax of the construction .  
3.  More o n  EIC's 
3. 1 . The Syntax of EIC's 
Given that EIC' s  are special instances of copular sentences, it seems worthwhile 
to ask to which argument in a 'regular' copulaI construction the NP in EIC ' s  
corresponds (and , accordingly, what the position and function of the expletive 
is) . I will refer to the NPs in a regular copular sentence like Andrea is an actress 
as the subject and the predicate NP, respectively .  
First note that the NP in EIC' s  possesses clear subject properties . The 
verb agrees with it (2 1 ) ,  and it is questioned by wer (who) rather than was (22) , 
both of which properties are characteristic of copular subjects , rather than 
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predicate NPs «23) and (24» . 
(2 1) Es sind/*ist die orthopadischen Striimpfe. 
it are/*is the orthopaedic stockings 
(22) remand sitzt im Schrank. Wer/#Was kann es sein? 
someone sits in-the closet - whol#What can it be 
(23) Die orthopadischen Striimpfe sind/*ist ein Problem. 
the orthopaedic stockings arel*is a problem 
(24) Peter ist so ein arroganter Idiot. 
Peter is such an arrogant idiot 
a. Was/IWer ist Peter? 
whatl#Who is Peter 
b .  Wer/#Was ist so ein arroganter Idiot? 
whol#What is such an arrogant idiot 
Furthermore, the NP in EIC ' s  (and clefts) may, at least to a certain extend , be 
quantificational, which is not possible for predicate NPs e .g .  in PIC ' s .  
(25) The speaker mentioned a number of languages that show this 
construction . 
Tatsachlich sind es/*sie fast alle europaischen Sprachen (, die diese 
Konstruktion aufweisen) 
'In fact , it is/*they are almost all European languages (who have this 
construction) , 
But if the NP is the subject, what would the expletive be? Clearly the es is not 
a mere 'Vorfeld ' expletive, since we find it in post-verbal position as well, and 
it is obligatory . 
(26) . . .  weil *(es) die orthopadischen Striimpfe sind. 
As a second guess, one might suspect that it is an object pronoun (there is no 
case distinction in the neuter paradigm between nominative and accusative) . 
However, as is well known , only subject es is possible in clause initial position 
in German, while an object pronoun in that position has to be in the strong form, 
das. The same effect shows up in copular sentences . While the predicative AP in 
(27) can in principle be taken up by either weak es or strong das, only the latter 
is possible if the pro-form shows up in clause initial position . 
(27) Guildo ist nicht so besonders attraktiv. 
Guildo is not so particularly attractive 
a.  Aber seine Band ist es. 
but his band is it 
b .  Das ist dafiir seine Band. 
the-NEUT is instead his band 
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c. * Es ist dafiir seine Band . 
it is instead his band ' Instead his band is. ' 
The generalization then is that pronouns in object or predicate XP function can 
only occur in the initial position in their strong form. In contrast we find the 
weak es as the initial constituent in EIC ' s , strongly suggesting that it does not go 
proxy for the predicative NP (thanks to Hubert Haider,p .c . , for pointing this out 
to me) . 
The same conclusion suggest itself from the data in (28) . If accented, the 
NP in EIe' s  can show up either clause initially or in the 'Mittelfeld ' .  Thus,  both 
(28 . a) and (28 .a') are appropriate answers to the question Who is it? However, 
if the NP is contextually given , as in the question Who is it? Guildo Hom ?, it is 
deaccented and can only show up post-verbally «28 .b) vs. (28 .b ' ) .  Again this is 
typical for the behavior of objects and predicative NPs, which can be preposed 
only if accented . 
(28) Who is it? (Guildo Hom?) 
a.  Es ist Guildo HORN. 
it is G. H. 
b .  Es 1ST Guildo Hom 
a: Guildo HORN ist es . 
G.H. is it 
b :  # Guildo Hom 1ST es. 
So generally, the es behaves like a typical subject (initial position in its weak, 
unstressed form) , while the NP doesn' t  (initial position only if stressed) . 
Finally , coordination data show that the NP and the verb be form a 
constituent to the exclusion of the es (29 .a) .  Comparing this to ordinary copular 
sentences , this is again typical for predicate NPs, as shown in (29 .b) ,  but not for 
subjects , cf. (29 .b) .  
(29) Sie behaupten, . . .  /They claim . . .  
a. . . .daB es { [eine Frau sein muB] und [keinesfalls ein Mann sein 
darf]} .  , . . .  that it must be woman and may not be a man . ' 
b .  . .  . daB Hans { [Hamlet sein muB] , und [keinesfalls Rosenkranz sein 
will] } .  
c .  * . . . daB Hamlet { [HANS sein muB] , und [keinesfalls FRITZ sein 
kann] } .  , . . .  that Hamlet must b e  Hans, and may not be Fritz . ' 
What can we make of this apparently contradictory evidence? I 'd like to suggest 
that the NP is in fact VP internal at s-structure, explaining the coordination facts 
as well as the fact that it cannot be in initial position if unaccented (the idea 
being that objects can be moved to that position only if especially marked as 
focus or topic , whereas subj ects go there as a default or are even base generated 
there) . At the same time, the expletive es occupies the canonical subj ect position 
Spec! , making it a default for the clause initial position . 
Crucially, however, the NP does not correspond to the predicate nominal 
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in regular copular sentences , but to the subject. Its position is the VP internal 
subject position SpecV. The canonical predicate nominal/object position is 
occupied by an empty element interpreted as a definite description, as claimed in 
the last section. The structure for EIC ' s  in comparison to that of an ordinary 
copular sentence is thus as in (30) . 
C O  SpecI 
(30) weil es 
Hans 
SpecV 
Hans 
tHans 
PredNP 
EC 
ein Schauspieler 
V 
ist 
ist 
To account for the agreement we could assume that the verb regularly agrees 
with SpecV rather than SpecI in German (which would in all ' normal ' cases be 
the trace of the element in SpecI anyway) . An alternative might be to assume 
some kind of chain formation between the NP and the expletive, e .g . co­
indexation or LF-replacement by movement. 
3. 2. EIC's as the Source for Clefts 
What is the relation between EIC ' s  and full clefts? Note that EIC ' s  and clefts 
occur with the very same set of elements, or, put the other way around , disallow 
the same elements . For a distributional fact, PPs and APs are possible in regular 
copular sentences (including PIC ' s) as shown in (3 1 . a) , but banned from 
expletive copular constructions with or without a relative clause (3 1 .  b) . 
(3 1)  A candidate is standing behind the wall. 
a. Sie ist aus Goslar/nervos.  
she is from Goslar/nervous 
b .  * Es ist aus Goslar/nervos (,was/die sie ist) . 
it is from Goslar/nervous (what/who she is) 
Likewise, the NP in both clefts and EIC ' s  must not be predicative (this was 
already implicit in the structure assumed in the last subsection) . So if the game 
show candidate, instead of guessing who ' s  behind the wall , is to guess the 
profession of a particular person, PIC ' s  are fine, while EIC ' s  aren' t. As shown 
in (32 .b) ,  adding a relative clause to form a full cleft does not change things for 
the better. 
(32) Geld oder Liebe (another game show) : What do you think is Luise' s 
hobby? Is she a break dancer, a painter, or a nude photographer? 
a. Sie k6nnte eine Aktfotografin sein . 
she could a nude-photographer be 
b .  # Es k6nnte eine Aktfotografin sein (was/die sie ist) . 
it could a nude-photographer be (what/who she is) 
Third, it is worth noting that both clefts and EIC' s  are restricted to the copular 
be, cf. (33) (of course, (33 .b) without the relative clause would be grammatical 
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as a PIC , Le .  with sielshe instead of eslit) . 
(33) A woman is sitting in the outer office. 
a .  Es  konnte deine zukiinftige Mitarbeiterin sein (die . . .  ) . 
a: It could be your future assistant (who is . . .  ) 
b .  * Es konnte deine Mitarbeiterin werden (die im Vorzimmer sitzt) . 
b �  * It could become your assistant (who is sitting in the outer office) . 
It is beyond the scope of this article to account for all the restrictions on EIC ' s  
and clefts discussed in this subsection . My conclusion is just that clefts and EIC ' s  
i n  German are one and the same construction . For concreteness '  sake I assume 
that the relative in a cleft binds the VP-intemal variable. Put the other way 
around, while the variable is free, hence to be contextually assigned its value, in 
EIC 's ,  it is linguistically controlled by the relative clause in full clefts .4 
In all the cases looked at so far, the descriptive content of the empty 
predicate NP could actually be derived from the linguistic context, i . e. from a 
preceding indefinite or demonstrative. I would like to point out ,  however, that 
the choice of value for that variable is just generally context dependent, consider 
e .g .  (34) . 
(34) (upon hearing a bird tweet) It was the nightingale, and not the lark. 
Furthermore, even in cases where there is a potential linguistic antecedent, the 
choice for the predicate variable is rather free. 
(35) I think I met your brother yesterday . It might also have been your cousin . 
It seems natural to assume that the predicate in the EIC in (35) is (the one) who 
1 met yesterday rather than (the one) 1 mistook /or your brother. So it seems as 
if quite arbitrary bits of co-text are readily available for constructing the value of 
the predicate variable. 
4. Alternatives 
4. 1 .  Dynamic Modals (Groenendijk, Stokho/ & Veltmann 1994, 1996) 
As said above, identity statements of the EIC-type can be conceived of either as 
statements about the referent assigned to a given discourse referent, or as 
statements about the referent matching a certain description . 
(36) A friend of min� had an accident. It might be my best friend .  
a. in some possibilities < w,g > ,  g(x) is my best friend in W 
b .  in  some (epistemically accessible) worlds w,  my best friend in  W 
is the person who had an accident in W 
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While I have argued for the latter perspective in this paper, Groenendijk, Stokhof 
and Veltman ( 1994, 1996; GSV) defend the first. Part and parcel of their 
implementation are two assumptions : i) modals,  e.g .  the logical operator 0 ,  
quantify over world--assignment pairs (as shown in (37.a» ;  ii) EIC ' s  contain a 
free variable of type < e > . Accordingly, (36) is translated as in (37.b) .  
(37) a .  s [  0 4>] = {i E s I s[4>] ;c 0} 
b .  3x[f-o-m(x) & had-acc(x)] & 0 best-f-o-m(x) 
As pointed out, this solution is semantically equivalent to the one advocated here. 
My basic objection concerns premise ii) from above: It is precisely the 
construction without a pronoun which has the semantics rendered by (37.b) ,  
while that with a pronoun -- the PIC -- doesn't ,  as we have seen above. GSV 
seem to gloss over the difference between PIC' s  and EIC ' s  in their paper, 
suggesting that PIC ' s  have the reading under debate (though they keep using 
EIC ' s  in illustrating their point) . Taking the linguistic data seriously, however, 
would force us to assume that there are in fact two types of modal quantification, 
one with and the other without access to assignments . The initial virtue of the 
GSV analysis ,  namely that the semantics is a natural result of the interplay 
between pronouns (translated as variables) and dynamic modals is thus gone. Put 
in other words, the data do not seem to argue in favor of the kind of assignment­
sensitive modality GSV propose in natural language. 
4. 2. It as a Descriptive Pronoun 
A solution that is somehow in between mine and the one discussed in the 
previous subsection would be to assume that the itles in the EIC is a special 
pronoun , Le .  it denotes a description or an individual concept. That is ,  while 
'ordinary ' pronouns like he/she/they denote rigid w.r . t. worlds ,  are thus 
unaffected by modal quantification , the it pronoun found in EIC ' s  responds to 
modality (a version of this solution could be implemented along the lines of van 
Rooy 1997, who assumes a dynamic logic with property variables , treating 
pronouns -- at least in some cases -- as definite articles operating on a familiar 
property variable; however, van Rooy just as GSV overlooks the difference 
between PIC ' s  and EIC ' s) .  
Independent of technical details, my objections to this kind of solution is :  
The description found in EIC ' s  just doesn' t  behave as  if  i t  were situated in the 
position of the it. Put differently , it is rarely possible to replace the it by a 
definite description in EIC's ,  as it should be for an E-type pronoun . For 
example, while an EIC subject cannot control a PRO subject in another, 
infinitival EIC (38 . a) ,  this is possible for definite subject NPs in ordinary copular 
sentences , witness (38 .b) .  
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(38) Someone was seen near the jailhouse. 
a. * Es k6nnte ein Hattling sein , ohne gleich Al Capone zu sein/sein 
zu mussen. 
'It could be a convict, without necessarily being AI Capone. '  
b .  Derjenige, der in der Nahe des Gefangnisses gesehen wurde, 
k6nnte ein Haftling sein , ohne gleich Al Capone zu sein/sein zu 
mussen. 
'The one who was seen near the jailhouse could be a convict 
without necessarily being Al Capone. '  
c .  Es  k6nnte ein Haftling sein , ohne daB es  gleich Al  Capone ist/sein 
muB . 
'It could be a convict, but it needn ' t  be Al Capone. ' 
For another, as noted before, it remains unclear why the alleged E-type pronoun 
is restricted to occur in be-copular sentences , cf. (33) above. 
Third, in modal EIC ' s  it is typically , if not always, the 'hidden' 
description (i . e. the predicate) that is interpreted within the scope of the modal , 
not the overt NP. Thus, as noted before, (39 .a) cannot mean ' the person actually 
standing behind the wall could -- under different circumstances -- be the loser' 
(this was initially pointed out to my by Maribel Romero) . As (39 .b) shows, the 
same effect shows up in clefts, i .e .  the relative clause does not seem to allow for 
a 'de re' reading (alias matrix index evaluation) . 
(39) a. 
b .  
It could just as well have been the loser. 
It could just as well have been the loser, who is standing behind 
the wall. 
c .  The person standing behind the wall could just as well have been 
the loser. 
This contrasts with subjects of ordinary copular sentences , as shown in (39 . c) ,  
which can have the very reading just discussed . This pattern i s  predicted under 
the assumption that the description is incarnated as a free variable inside the VP, 
hence c-commanded by the modal (similar to the NP the loser in (39 . c)) , and that 
the relative clause in full clefts is anchored to that variable. Under the 
assumption, however, that the it is a descriptive pronoun , this behavior is 
completely unexpected; rather one would expect (39 . a) to mean the same as 
(39 . c) .  
A related forth argument is that the NP in EIC ' s  patterns with subjects 
rather than predicate nominals -- among other things -- w.r . t . presuppositions .  
That is ,  while the NP his daughter used as  a predicate nominal in ordinary 
copular sentences and PIC 's  does not project its presuppositions, as seen in 
(40.a) ,  it does if used in EIC ' s  and clefts, cf. (40 .b) .  That 's  why we don 't  get 
the monk reading for the latter sentence. 
(40) a .  
b .  
She/The woman he just kissed could be his daughter. 
It could be his daughter (who he just kissed) 
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This should again be the other way around if the it was the subject of the EIC 
and the NP functioned as the predicate NP. 
S. Appendix: O n  the Need for Dynamic/Descriptive/E-Type/Individual 
Concept Pronouns 
Finally I 'd like to browse through some examples from the literature which have 
been take to indicate the need for decriptive pronouns or some equivalent thereof. 
(4 1) a.  
b .  
My home once was in Maryland , but now it' s  i(phfee 1972 :425) 
My car used to be a Ford , but now it' s a Toy�ssen 1984 : 179) 
According to the authors quoted, the it in the second clause cannot denote an 
individual (which would imply that a part of Maryland was now in L.A. , or that 
my Ford somehow transformed into a Toyota) , but must denote something which 
can depend on the temporal index , e .g .  an individual concept or a full 
description . Though this observation is unobjectionable, note that we cannot tell 
from eyesight whether the examples in (4 1 )  really involve PIC ' s , or EIC' s  (from 
which we would expect such a behavior) . The reason is of course that it - - just 
as its German counterpart es - - can either be an expletive or a neuter pronoun . 
German turns out to be a good test case, since it shows gender agreement 
even with inanimate noun phrases .  Thus the translation of home, Heimat is 
feminine and can only be picked up by a feminine pronoun ,  as shown in (42 . a) .  
When i t  comes to translating the second clause of (4 1 .a) ,  however, the feminine 
pronoun is impossible, but expletive es is called for (the same holds mutatis 
mutandis for the translation of (4 1 .b) using the masculine Wagen for car) . 
(42) a.  
b .  
Meine Heimat liegt im Ruhrpott, und ich liebe sie/*es sehr. 
My homefem is in the 'Ruhrpott' , and I love her/*it very much . 
Meine Heimat war der Ruhrpott, aber mittlerweile ist es/*sie 
Koln . 
My homefem used to be the 'Ruhrpott' , but meanwhile itl*she is 
Cologne. ' 
This strongly suggests that were are dealing with EIC ' s  in (4 1) as well , so the 
analysis given before carries over to these cases: It is not the it which denotes a 
description, but the variable in prediCate NP position . 
Let us now turn to cases in which no EIC analysis is possible, i . e .  those 
involving he or she. 
(43) a. 
b .  
Mary hasn' t  yet found the man she will marry. Now that she has 
a job in Washington , she hoR€k>e\JeIVAiWIh68:, ffimssen 1 984 : 1 87) 
Maria hat noch immer nicht den Mann zum heiraten gefunden . 
Jetzt, wo sie in Koln arbeitet, hofft sie, daB sie ihn treffen wird . 
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Apparently , himlihn in (43) must denote the description the man she will marry, 
contradicting the generalization suggested . Upon closer inspection, however, 
things aren' t  that clear, for one could argue that even the man she will marry is 
used 'referentially ' . The idea would be that the speaker thinks of the man of 
Andrea's  dreams as being out there, though undiscovered yet. 
This is not a far-fetched story, for if we construct an example in which 
such a strategy is not available, the PIC becomes impossible again , cf. (44) . 
(44) Bis letzte Woche war Andrea Sawatzki die Frau, die er heiraten wollte, 
aber jetzt ist es/#sie eine andere. 
'Until recently , A .S .  was the woman he wanted to marry ,  but now itl#she 
is someone else. ' 
Note that an EIC is possible, but the PIC isn ' t  (unless I want to say that Andrea 
has become a different person, of course) . This is again as expected, given that 
here the she would unambiguously have to denote the concept ' the woman of my 
dreams' .  
A problematic case in English is (45 .a) .  
(45) a. This year the president is a Republican. Next year he will be a 
Democrat. 
b .  1m Moment ist der Kanzler ein Christdemokrat, aber ab Herbst 
wird es/*er hoffentlich ein Sozialdemokrat sein . 
I don ' t  have much to say about (45 .a) ,  except that it' s German equivalent (45 .b) 
is awkward, unless transformed into an EIC (the only reading the PIC has is one 
where the present chancellor actually changes sides -- an unlikely scenario to say 
the least) . Unless further subtleties are discovered, it seems as though there is a 
real micro-parameter lurking here. 
In general it should be stressed that more research is needed . In particular I do 
not want to claim that there are no descriptive pronouns in natural language, see 
e .g .  Neale 199 1 ,  Heim & Kratzer 1997: 1 1  and van Rooy 1997 :ch . 3  for recent 
arguments pro such pronouns. My more moderate claim is that we do not find 
them in PIC ' s  (and don ' t  need them in EIC ' s) .  But if that ' s  the picture, the 
question arises what actually blocks them there, or, why they do not interact with 
modals in PIC ' s  the way full NPs do (or the variable in EIC ' s  for that matter) . 
Other questions arise as soon as we broaden the data base. For example, 
what is the relation between EIC 's  and what could be called DIC 's ,  i .e .  
demonstrative expletive constructions, such as  in  (46)1 
(46) (upon seeing a scheme in the distance) 
a. That could be my best friend . 
b .  Das k6nnte mein bester Freund sein . 
These behave parallel to EIC ' s  in many respects , yet there IS a clear 
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demonstrative effect due to the use of that/das. But obviously , the notion of a 
demonstrative expletive does not make any sense. My suspicion is that a closer 
examination of cases like (46) will eventually lead to a revaluation of the 
semantic contribution of the it in EIC ' s  as well (after all, couldn' t  this be the 
same it as in it 's cold?) . 
Finally , as Irene Heim (p .c . )  points out, there are cases in which 
pronouns do seem to behave like descriptions in modal environments . If mother 
goat knocks on the door of her hut, and the seven little goats open immediately 
without even asking who ' s  there, she might say (47) . 
(47) Are you crazy to open the door like this? ! I could have been the wolf! 
I think that not only the choice of first person but also the temporal structure of 
the sentence contributes to this effect; closer examination is certainly needed . 
On the occasion of encountering (47) , some readers might think of a 
whole class of resembling cases with second person pronouns, in which the 
addressee is actually uncertain about the intended referent of the speaker' s  use of 
you,  e .g .  in an utterance of You are a fool. (Stalnaker 1978;  see Haas-Spohn 
199 1 for a recent overview and more references) . It is usually assumed that in 
such cases (or maybe in general) the addressee is entitled to reinterpret the 
utterance as ' the person the speaker addresses is a fool ' in order to gain a single 
proposition as the meaning of the utterance. This proposition is called the 
diagonal of the character expressed by the sentence (see again the references just 
mentioned) . Isn ' t  that very similar to the cases discussed in this paper? I guess 
it is, in that one can perhaps re-interpret an utterance of He is my best friend 
simply as ' the person the speaker intends to refer to by her use of he is her best 
friend ' ,  if one does not know who that particular person is. In essence one gets 
rid of assignment functions altogether (this is argued for by van Rooy 1997, if I 
understand him correctly) . 
But even if we assimilate the treatment of first/second and third person 
pronouns in this way, the lesson to be learned from the PIC--EIC-contrast seems 
to remain constant: Diagonalization is a viable option at the sentence level , when 
it comes to updating the context with the proposition expressed by the sentence. 
However, modals, perhaps linguistic expressions in general, do not use the 
diagonal of their argument' s  meaning . Put plainly , He could be my best friend 
can be interpreted using its diagonal as in ' the person the speaker intends to refer 
to is such that he could be speaker' s  best friend ' ,  but not as ' It could be that the 
person the speaker intends to refer to is her best friend '  . 
To conclude this paper, I have attempted to show that PIC ' s  and EIC ' s  are 
syntactically and -- consequently semantically -- quite different from each other. 
While PIC ' s  are ordinary copular sentences with a pronominal subject, EIC' s  
were argued to be copular sentences with an empty predicate NP, whose value 
is assigned from the context (EIC' s) or an extraposed relative clause (clefts) . A 
more general point is that we do not seem to find any interesting interaction 
between pronouns and modals, as we do between descriptions and modals. 
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Accordingly the PIC--EIC contrast provides an argument against varying 
assignment functions in modal backgrounds ,  not even in epistemic ones . 
Endnotes 
* I 'd  like to thank the audiences at Sinn & Bedeutung 1997 , the Amherst 
semantics reading group, SALT 8 and the HCRC in Edinburgh for their help and 
comments, far too little of which I have been able to take into consideration in 
this version . 
1 .  These definitions ,  in particular (8 .d) are adapted from GSV ( 1996: 1 88ft) , 
though most of them are current in dynamic logics .  The main difference to 
GSV is that I do not use pegs but directly associate variables with individuals, 
a point which is -- as far as I can see -- orthogonal to the issues relevant here. 
For brevity, I use P(a) instead of a= ,x[px] ; ,-expressions in turn are 
used as abbreviations for full Russellian descriptions see e .g .  (20) below. 
2 .  Why 's supports 1/;'  rather than 's equals s[I/;J'? Because the speaker may of 
course change s through I/; by introducing new discourse referents ( =changing 
assignments) , but she may not eliminate worlds .  So what is required then, is 
that every world w in s must find itself in at least on possibility in s ' . This is 
defined using the notion of support: 
(i) s subsists in s '  if for every < w,g > E s, there is at least one g '  
such that g � g '  and < w,g ' >  E s '  (cf. GSV 1996: 1 88t) 
(ii) s supports I/; iff s[1/;] exists and s subsists in s[I/;J (GSV 
1996: 192) 
3 .  Could (8) ever be felicitous by these definitions? Intuitions tend to say 'no ' . 
Surely not as long as I know who my best friend is (see the reasoning in the 
last paragraph) . A felicitous utterance of (8) would require that whatever g(x) 
had an accident in some < g, W > E s is my best friend in some other w '  with 
< g ', w ' >  E s  as well. That is, being my best friend must at least potentially be 
contingent on who had the accident. And I do in fact think that if (8) has any 
meaning at all , this is what it says. 
4. The situation is less straightforward in English , since clefts and EIC ' s  do 
not behave as parallel , as pointed out to my be Caroline Heycock and Antony 
Kroch (p . c . )  who attribute this argument to Higgins 1972 . 
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